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This paper analyses some fiscal aspects of mortgage debt in the EU. It first describes the main 
fiscal instruments that governments use to affect mortgage-financed home-ownership. In the 
empirical part, real mortgage debt growth is analysed for 15 EU countries using pooled 
regressions. Fiscal effects are included via after-tax interest rates. Other factors shown to be 
relevant for mortgage debt growth are house prices, financial deregulation, and stock markets 
fiscal measures in reducing housing market volatility is highlighted. 
 
 
JEL classification: E51, E62, G21, H31, R21 
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while the effects of household income and inflation are less evident. Finally, the role of structural  
Non-technical summary 
 
Mortgage debt in most EU countries has risen quickly in the last few years. In line with 
its growing size, mortgage debt has taken up a prominent place in economic analysis and 
macroeconomic policy-making. Changing property prices in combination with mortgage debt 
changes may have macroeconomic consequences, e.g. via taking up mortgage debt for non-
housing consumption purposes (“mortgage equity withdrawal”). In addition, interest rate setting 
on mortgage debt (fixed, variable) may have implications for monetary policy transmission. 
Financial stability considerations may also rise in tandem with mortgage debt.  
The aim of this paper is to analyse some effects of fiscal instruments on mortgage debt 
growth in the EU. Empirical research on mortgage debt has largely ignored the role of fiscal 
instruments affecting housing markets and mortgage credit. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
various government instruments affect mortgage-financing decisions. In particular, fiscal 
measures may affect housing-related decisions via the taxation of imputed rent on own houses, 
the deductibility of mortgage interest payments from income tax, and capital gains taxes on the 
revenue of selling a house. Most EU governments subsidise owner-occupied housing, especially 
when mortgage-financed, on account of foreseen social and macroeconomic benefits.  
Simple analysis, based on a case-study (Sweden) and on a graphical comparison of 
mortgage debt and the degree of fiscal subsidisation, already hints at potential effects of fiscal 
instruments. The Swedish housing market crisis in the early 1990s reflected a substantial 
reduction in fiscal subsidisation, as confirmed in a number of studies, although other factors also 
were important. Comparing mortgage debt levels with the degree of fiscal subsidisation, it is 
noteworthy that the Netherlands, the country with the highest mortgage debt-to-GDP level, 
provides the highest degree of fiscal subsidisation, while Greece, a country with one of the lowest 
debt ratios, on balance imposes a tax levy on mortgage-financed housing.    
A more formalised approach to determinants of mortgage credit, and of the specific role 
of fiscal factors in that, is undertaken by using pooled regressions for mortgage debt for 15 EU 
countries, over the period 1982-2003. The estimates indicate that real mortgage lending growth is 
positively affected by stock market growth, by house price increases and by financial 
deregulation measures, while after-tax interest rates exerted a negative effect. The latter variable 
includes housing subsidy elements via the deductibility of mortgage interest payments that is 
allowed in most EU countries. Real growth of disposable income also positively affects mortgage 
demand in some versions of the estimates but not in all. A negative effect of consumer price 
inflation on mortgage growth was found in some estimates. These results are fairly robust: while 
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changing the timeframe has some impact on the conclusions, the group of countries included in 
the sample does not much affect results, nor does the estimation-technique employed. 
Finally, the use of fiscal instruments in correcting housing market imbalances is briefly 
discussed. In doing so, the need for an intervention is assumed, and policy options in other areas 
such as supervision, are disregarded. Structural fiscal measures may contribute to reducing 
volatility on housing and mortgage markets, for instance via increased reliance on automatic 
stabilisation, or via reducing mortgage interest relief via tax deductibility. Supply-side measures 
(e.g. a tenure-neutral fiscal system encouraging the development of a private rental sector as an 
alternative to occupying a house) also may play a useful role in this respect. Caution is needed in 
the active use of fine-tuning measures, such as changes to stamp duty rates, to correct housing 
market imbalances, given doubts about possibilities for adequate timing and calibration of such 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Mortgage debt in the EU has risen quickly in the last few years. As a consequence, its relevance 
for economic policies has increased as well. In particular, there is increased attention for its 
implications for macro-economic developments, money growth and financial stability. From a 
macroeconomic point of view, mortgage lending may affect wealth and balance sheet effects of 
asset prices, depending on opportunities for mortgage equity withdrawal: the use of mortgage 
financing for non-housing purposes. From a monetary policy point of view, housing finance 
aspects deserve close monitoring as bank loans to households for house purchase are a 
counterpart to the monetary aggregate M3. Furthermore, mortgage markets may affect the 
monetary transmission process, for instance via interest rate fixations (fixed or variable interest 
rate mortgages). Financial stability considerations, finally, call for examination of the risk 
implications of growing mortgage debt levels for both banks and consumers.   
 
While a growing number of studies on mortgage debt and house prices emerge, the attention paid 
to the role of fiscal factors usually is rather limited. The theoretical literature suggests that fiscal 
instruments may have a potentially large role in affecting mortgage developments, but there is 
only little empirical work in which such fiscal factors are included for European countries. This is 
not very satisfactory, also taking into account that taxes and subsidies may be used as policy 
instruments to steer housing and mortgage developments. 
 
This paper considers the contribution of fiscal measures in the EU countries to trends in 
household debt. In particular, we conduct an empirical analysis of the role of fiscal factors in 
mortgage debt growth in the EU countries, and discuss the role of these fiscal instruments in 
steering housing markets. While focussing on mortgage debt, inevitably we will also touch upon 
housing market developments, as mortgage growth is much related to what happens in the 
housing market. Taking a cross-country approach inevitably reduces country-specific elements 
that can be included in the analysis. The availability and quality of relevant data differs 
substantially across countries, while institutional characteristics specific to one country cannot be 
taken into account. Thus, this study focuses on common elements in mortgage financing in the 
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The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes recent mortgage developments and the 
main fiscal instruments used by governments in the countries of the former EU-15 to steer 
housing market developments. Section 3 then provides some evidence of the effects of fiscal 
instruments on mortgage growth, using pooled regressions. The question whether fiscal 
instruments could be used to address housing and mortgage market imbalances is taken up in 
section 4. Section 5 contains the conclusions. 
 
2.  Mortgage debt and fiscal policy 
 
Household indebtedness has grown quickly in the EU in the last decade. This mainly reflects a 
sharp increase in mortgage debt, although there are remarkable differences between the EU 
countries as regards level and growth rates (Table 1). In 2003, mortgage debt levels varied from 
13% of GDP (Italy) to 100% of GDP (the Netherlands), resulting in the Dutch mortgage market 
being more than double the size of Italian one. Real growth of mortgage debt varied from -1% 
(Portugal) and +22% (Greece and Ireland) and - at first glance – do not appear to be closely 
related to real house price increases.   
  
Table 1. General EU mortgage and housing market characteristics, 2003. 
 
Mortgage debt      
 
(% of GDP) 




growth rate  
(%) 
Growth in real 
house prices 
(%) 
Austria 26.4 1.4  9.0  -2.9
§ 
Belgium 28.5  1.8 3.5 6.3 
Denmark 87.5  3.9  4.8 -0.4 
Finland 35.6 1.2  7.6  5.0 
France 24.7  9.1  7.7  9.9 
Germany 54.3  27.2 0.9 -2.4 
Greece 17.4  0.6  21.6  2.3 
Ireland 45.0  1.4  21.7  11.2 
Italy 13.3  4.1  18.5  10.0 
Luxembourg 33.4  0.2  15.6  5.1
ө  
Netherlands  99.9  10.7 14.3 0.3 
Portugal 50.6  1.6 -1.1  -1.6 
Spain 42.1  7.4  16.4  14.5 
Sweden 50.0 3.2 5.7  4.6 
UK 70.4  26.4  3.4  18.1 
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Differences in mortgage debt levels in Europe reflect a variety of factors, including social 
preferences, the degree of financial deregulation, and governments’ past and current housing- and 
mortgage-related policies. Governments affect mortgage debt growth and housing market 
developments in numerous ways, ranging from restrictions on the use of land to mortgage interest 
payment deductions from income tax, and from effects of government debt levels on (mortgage) 
interest rates to subsidised housing loans from state banks.
3 Below, we concentrate on three main 
fiscal instruments: 
 
•  Tax on imputed rent 
In a minority of the countries in the sample (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), 
owner-occupiers had to report imputed rent to their national tax offices in 2003. The background 
to this tax is to put owning and occupying a house on an equal footing with other investments that 
offer a financial return rather than services in kind. In countries were imputed rent is taxed, the 
tax levy usually is relatively low reflecting the use of out-of-date market values as valuation base 
Instead of taxing imputed rent, some governments have introduced a property tax, amongst others 
on account of high enforcement costs of a tax on imputed rent (Freeman et al., 1996). 
 
•  Interest deductibility 
Interest deductibility provides a fiscal advantage to house owners that finance their dwelling via a 
mortgage rather than via own equity, thus increasing leverage. A large majority of EU countries 
allows income tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments. Usually, the facility is open only 
for owner-occupied dwelling, and there are limits to the amount deductible. While in some 
countries it is eligible for all owner-occupiers (Spain, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the 
Netherlands), in others interest deductibility is targeted to specific households (Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom). A few countries (Austria, Belgium) allow tax deductibility of part of the 
reimbursement payments for a limited time period. 
 
While this fiscal provision may increase the affordability of principal dwellings, and thus the 
amount of mortgage debt taken up, it could also impact on the type of mortgage loan. In the 
Netherlands, for instance, a mortgage loan coupled with a capital insurance used to be fiscally 
favoured. Similarly, interest-only loans were introduced to take full advantage of the nearly 
                                                           
3 It should be recognised that, in their turn, housing market developments also have an effect on 
governments’ financial positions. Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2002) provide a detailed description of 
asset price effects on fiscal variables. 
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unlimited deductibility of mortgage interest payments. In Germany, Bauspar loans were fiscally 
favoured, limiting the development of other loan types (Mercer Oliver Wyman, 2003). 
 
•  Capital gains tax 
In most countries the capital gain on the sale of principal owner-occupied dwellings is, in 
principle, included in capital gains taxes. In practice, however, it is often exempted, particularly if 
the owner has been occupying the dwelling for a number of years before selling it (“anti-
speculation clause”). Such exemptions usually do not apply to financial investments. 
 
Table 2 roughly summarises countries’ fiscal treatment of housing and its finance. Generally, the 
table presents the situation for an owner-occupier living in his/her primary dwelling. As to the 
capital gains tax, the table describes the tax regime for an owner-occupier selling his/her house 
after having lived in it for a long period (more than 10 years) and using the sale proceeds to buy 
another house. A country-specific description of the three fiscal instruments as prevailing in 2003 
is included in annexes A1-A3. 
4 
 
Table 2. Main tax categories affecting housing/mortgages in the EU as per 2003. 
  Tax on imputed rent  Interest deductibility  Capital gains tax
a 
Austria N Y  N 
Belgium Y  Y  N 
Denmark N  Y  N 
Finland N  Y  N 
France N N N 
Germany N  N  N 
Greece N Y N 
Ireland N Y  N 
Italy Y  Y  N 
Luxembourg Y  Y  N 
Netherlands  Y Y N 
Portugal N  Y  N 
Spain N  Y  N 
Sweden N  Y  N 
UK N  N  N 
a Capital letters denote absence of a capital gains tax, small letters refer to a capital gains tax being in place, 
but the gains on selling a house being de facto exempted, for instance because it is sold a certain number of 
year after its acquisition.   
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2003) 
 
                                                           
4 Donner (2001) and ECB (2003) provide information on other fiscal instruments used in EU countries to 
stimulate housing production and consumption. 
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Comparing the tax treatment of housing as described in the table with that of renting suggests that 
government fiscal systems tend to favour ownership of dwellings over renting, and debt-financing 
over other sources of financing. Thus, tax systems are not neutral, i.e. the decision for the owner 
to occupy the residence himself or to rent it out is affected by tax considerations. In a neutral 
system, imputed rent is taxed, mortgage interest payments are fully deductible, and capital gains 
are subject to a capital gains tax, as these tax elements normally also applies to landlords.
5  
Governments seek to influence private agents' housing decisions as housing is considered a merit-
good with positive external effects, while income distribution arguments may also play a role. 
However, the financial involvement in the housing market appears to be trending downward, with 
a shift in emphasis from production to consumption subsidies, and an increased market 
orientation (Ball and Grilli, 1997).   
 
Van den Noord (2003) has quantified governments’ involvement in housing markets for the euro 
area countries. He calculated the 1999 tax wedges and the resulting real cost of financing a house 
(nominal interest rate plus tax wedge minus inflation), taking into account information on tax 
interest deductibility, tax credits and imputed income from housing. His results, reproduced in 
table 3, show that governments on balance subsidise housing, with few exceptions where it is 
neutral (Belgium, France, Germany), and one in which, on balance, a tax is levied on mortgage-
financed housing (Greece). It should be noted, though, that explicit government subsidies have 
not been included in the calculations. This would change the picture for instance for Germany 
because of government expenditures for its Eigenheimzulage. 
 
Table 3. Net housing subsidisation in the euro area, following Van den Noord (2003) 
 Real  cost  of 
financing 
Tax wedge




Austria 3.6  -0.6  Ireland  1.4  -0.9 
Belgium 3.6   0.0  Italy  2.6 -0.5 
Finland 2.5  -0.9  Luxembourg  2.7  -1.0 
France 4.1    0.0  Netherlands  0.6  -2.0 
Germany 3.9    0.0  Portugal  2.4  -0.2 
Greece 5.7    1.6  Spain  1.6  -0.9 
a A minus-sign indicates net subsidisation of owner-occupied housing.  
Source: Van den Noord (2003) 
 
                                                           
5 Housing at the same time is also a consumption good. Tax neutrality in a broader sense thus would imply 
that houses also need to be taxed similar to durable consumption goods like cars.  
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Plotting Van den Noord’s measure of real financing costs and 2003 mortgage debt levels as 
percentage of GDP shows the expected negative correlation. The Netherlands and Greece stand 
out as opposite cases regarding real financing costs, which is reflected in the highest, respectively 
the one-but-lowest mortgage debt ratio.  
 
























Following the rough indications of a relation between fiscal instruments and mortgage debt, we 
now turn to a more formal empirical analysis. Generally, linking fiscal factors to mortgage credit 
growth is far from easy. Data on fiscal aspects of mortgage debt – to the extent available - are far 
from homogeneous. Furthermore, the identification of fiscal effects is complicated by fiscal 
changes sometimes being spread out over a long period, by announcements of changes well ahead 
of its implementation, and by measures being compensated by other fiscal measures.
6  
 
                                                           
6 For instance, the abolition of mortgage interest deductibility in the UK was spread out over 21 years 
mortgage interest tax deductibility, compensated by the introduction of a government subsidy scheme 
(Eigenheimzulage). 
axis), 2003. 
3. Some evidence on fiscal effects on mortgage debt 
(1979-2000). An illustration of compensating fiscal measures is the abolition in Germany in 1986 of 
axis) 
Studies on mortgage debt growth in Europe often focus on describing the effects of tax structures 
in one or a few countries (e.g. Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2002, and Debelle, 2004). Another 
branch of the literature analyses cross-country differences in mortgage lending. Freeman et al. 
(1996), analysing tax and subsidy systems in twelve OECD countries, conclude that tenure 
patterns are associated with fiscal subsidies, but there are many more factors operating. Studies 
that approach the subject from an empirical angle include Calza et al. (2001), studying total loan 
growth (households and corporations) at the aggregate euro area level, using a VECM with GDP 
growth and (before-tax) interest rates as explanatory factors. In addition, the determinants of bank 
lending in single EU countries has been the subject of empirical research, as e.g. Fitzpatrick and 
McQuinn (2004) for Ireland, De Greef and De Haas (2000) for the Netherlands, Fernandez-
Corugedo and Muellbauer (2003) for the UK, and Magri (2002) for Italy. Following the severe 
housing crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s, a number of papers have assessed the causes of this 
crisis, also paying attention to changes in fiscal conditions (Box 1).    
 
Box 1. The housing market crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s 
 
The Swedish housing market crisis early 1990s was characterised by sharply falling mortgage 
credit and dwelling prices. This box recalls the main developments, focussing in particular on the 
role of changes in fiscal instruments.   
 
The Swedish housing market had experienced large increases in mortgage lending and rising 
prices at the end of the 1980s, following financial deregulation that started 1986, and foreign 
exchange markets deregulation. At the same time, the economy was growing fast, housing tax 
deductions were increased and interest subsidies were expanded, when real interest rates were 
already declining. This process reversed as of 1990, when an international recession hit the 
economy, interest rates rose, and banks started tightening mortgage lending standards, as reflected 
in higher loan-to-value ratios. House prices already were falling, when in 1991 a dual income tax 
system was introduced, with tenure neutrality as an objective. Mortgage interest payments could 
no longer be deducted at the marginal tax rate (up to 70%) but only at a standard capital income 
rate (30%). At the same time, the government abolished the tax on imputed rent, introduced a 
property tax, introduced VAT on new dwellings, and reduced subsidies to the construction sector. 
 
A number of empirical studies support the impression arising from this brief description that 
changes in fiscal parameters may have worked out pro-cyclical and contributed to the housing 
market crisis. In particular, Englund et al. (1995) estimate that the change in tax rates applying to 
deductible mortgage interest payments had a negative house price effect of 10-15% by 1993, on  a 
total decline of 25%. In addition, the construction sector received a heavy blow. Housing 
completions in the 1990s where only around one-fourth of the levels seen in the build-up phase of 
the boom. Agell et al. (1995) also conclude that these tax rate changes had a strong negative 
impact on house prices (capitalisation effect), depressing private consumption. The much less 
favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied houses has been identified by Englund (1999) as one 
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This paper makes a first attempt to include relevant fiscal factors in empirical research on EU 
mortgage credit growth. Specifically, we apply pooled regressions using an ad hoc specification. 
Explanatory variables predominantly reflect demand factors, assuming mortgage supply to be 
largely accommodating. While not ideal, we have chosen this approach in view of the data 
limitations. For the same reason, this paper focuses on the 15 countries of the former EU only and 
not on the current 25 EU members. Pooled regressions are used to generate sufficient 
observations for tracking common determinants of real mortgage debt growth. 
 
Table 4 Basic characteristics of real growth of mortgage debt in  
15 EU countries, 1982-2003 
 Average  real  growth 
rate of mortgage loans   
(%) 
Standard deviation  
(%) 
Austria   7.4   4.2 
Belgium   4.0   4.8 
Denmark   5.0   4.9 
Finland   4.8   6.8 
France   3.0   2.9 
Germany   3.8   3.1 
Greece   9.4    13.8 
Ireland 12.7    10.8 
Italy   7.2  7.0 
Luxembourg
§   8.9   6.7 
Netherlands   7.2   5.3 
Portugal 14.6    10.4 
Spain
¶ 14.8    5.4 
Sweden   4.2   6.6 
UK   8.2   6.3 
Data sources: see annex 2. 
¶ Series starting 1984. 
§ Series starting 1997. 
 
 
Real mortgage debt is the main dependent variable, with nominal debt deflated by the national 
consumer price index. Table 4 gives an indication of the country-variation in real debt growth. 
Persistent high growth rates are seen in many Southern-European countries (Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, and Italy) as well as in Ireland and the Netherlands. On the other hand, the average real 
growth in Sweden has been rather modest but relatively volatile.  
 
As to the choice of explanatory variables, theoretical considerations and data availability lead to 
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-  Disposable income. Higher real disposable income per person increases the affordability of 
houses, and thus would have a positive effect on mortgage-financing. Generally, owner-
occupation levels in Europe rise with income, with the exception of Greece.
7 Higher income 
may also increase economic confidence and job security, providing incentives to increase 
debt for consumption-smoothing. A negative relation between income and mortgage debt 
arises if households use higher income for debt repayment, for instance because debtless 
ownership raises social status or facilitates early retirement. While positive effects dominate 
in empirical studies in this area, exceptions have been reported for the US and Italy (Crook, 
2003). 
 
-  After-tax interest rate/capital costs. Low mortgage interest rates increase households' 
capacity to borrow while keeping the same debt servicing costs as per cent of income. Low 
rates may also increase borrowing against real estate to finance consumption expenditures 
(mortgage equity withdrawal). Whether a nominal or a real interest rate is more relevant is an 
open issue; a real rate captures real financing costs, a nominal rate is more relevant for 
assessing the maximum allowed mortgage, labelled the ‘tilt’ effect.
8 Given tax deductibility 
of mortgage interest payments in many countries, it is the after-tax interest rates that should 
matter. Interest rates are an important element in the broader concept of capital costs of 
housing, reflecting the costs of capital invested in housing. 
 
In particular, we adopted the following measure: 
CC = (1-t).r. M          [1] 
With   CC   = capital costs of mortgage-financed own housing 
  t      = relevant tax rate for mortgage interest deductibility 
  r   = nominal mortgage interests rate  
  M     = mortgage value 
 
Dividing both sides by the house price then gives: 
CC  = (1-t).r. M         [ 2 ]  
       Vt                  Vt     
With   V  = price of the house 
                                                           
7 Of the Greek households with less than 60% of the median income, 90% owns a home, compared to just 
over 80% of households with incomes of more than 140% of the median income. For the EU-15, the 
average numbers are 50% and 72% respectively (Eurostat, 2004). 
8 Apart from demand effects, the interest rate effect may also capture decreased willingness of banks to 
extend credit in case of higher interest rates because of increased default risk (Hoffman, 2004). 
15
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This reflects the nominal after-tax interest costs for the mortgage-financed part of the house 
value, which is the variable used in the estimations below. 
 
-  Wealth. Higher wealth could lead households to invest more in houses, being part of the 
investment portfolio. A positive effect may also arise from future home-owners building up 
the required down-payment via financial investments. However, real estate can also be an 
alternative to stock or bond market investment. Crook (2003) reports that for the US and Italy 
positive relationships are the rule. We use national stock market indices as an indicator for 
financial non-housing wealth. 
 
-  House prices. High house prices may choke off mortgage demand of starters on the housing 
ladder, but may spur demand by current owners as it creates room for equity withdrawal 
where allowed. In addition, higher house prices raise the amount of mortgage to be financed. 
Furthermore, a positive coefficient could be expected on account of households’ speculative 
behaviour. Using adaptive expectations formation, households may see current house price 
increases as indicating an upward trend, creating incentives to buy and finance the dwelling 
to profit from future capital gains.
9 The comparability of house price data is rather low. 
 
-  Mortgage supply. Deregulation in the European financial markets has removed many 
obstacles to a competitive supply of mortgages. Increased competition and decreasing 
regulation have lowered the interest mark-up and caused a catch-up in mortgage lending. It 
also paved the way to financial innovations, like interest-only loans, making mortgage 
financing feasible for a larger part of the population. The timing and pace of liberalisation of 
mortgage markets has varied substantially between countries (Girouard and Blöndal, 2001). 
Financial deregulation is crudely approximated by dummies taking value 1 in years of major 




                                                           




Working Paper Series No. 526
September 2005 
-  Consumer price inflation. Inflation operates through various ways on the demand for 
mortgages. On the one hand, high inflation can be reflected in higher nominal interest rates, 
lowering mortgage demand as the part of household income that has to be spent on housing 
finance increases. In addition, high inflation shifts the burden of interest payments and 
repayments to the initial phase of the loan, with negative effects on housing credit demand 
(Nickell, 2002). High inflation variability, which usually increases with inflation, also may 
exert a dampening effect on mortgage demand. On the other hand, to the extent that 
households’ income increases in line with inflation, it may reduce the debt-to-income ratio 
and thus create room for additional debt take-up. Furthermore, inflation may give rise to 
additional housing demand from investors that regard real estate as a reasonably inflation-safe 
hedge. Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) argue that this can be the case in particular if the prevailing 
pension financing system is of a pay-as-you-go type, as this hinders the coming into being of 
an equity investment culture. Finally, tax advantages of mortgage interest deductibility rise 




Information on the sources and the construction of the data to be used is included in Annex 2. The 
logarithm of real mortgage debt is our main dependent variable, with nominal debt deflated by the 
national consumer price index. The use of logs in this type of analysis is standard.
11 Series have 
been tested on unit roots (Annex 4). It appears that most variables are stationary when expressed 
in changes in logarithms. While expressing the variables in log-levels in principle would be 
preferable to detect longer-term relations, the stationarity tests indicate differences in the degree 
of differencing needed to arrive at stationarity, thus not supporting estimations in levels. 
Therefore, the change in the log of real mortgage debt is taken as the dependent variable, and 
most independent variables are also expressed in change-in-log form.
12  
 
                                                           
10 A numerical example may explain this. Assuming a 4% nominal interest rate, 2% inflation and a relevant 
tax rate of 50%, the after-tax real interest rate is (50%*4%)-2% = 0%. Assuming the inflation rate to 
increase by 2% to 4%, and be fully reflected in the nominal interest rate (6%) so that the real-interest rate  
is constant, the after-tax real interest rate decreases to -1%, i.e. (50%*6%)-4%. 
11 Using logs takes into account that in countries with high debt levels the mortgage market may already be 
full-grown while high mortgage credit growth in other countries may reflect some catching-up from low 
initial levels. This choice is supported by a correlation coefficient of -0.62 between 1980 mortgage debt 
levels as % of GDP and average real mortgage growth rates over the 1981-2003 period.  
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Table 5 contains the basic results for the estimations for the 15 EU countries. All estimates 
include country-specific intercepts to capture mortgage-related factors peculiar to the country 
concerned. This may, for instance, reflect differences in cultural values (e.g. the social status of 
owning a debt-free house) and in legal efficiency (e.g. the time it takes for a bank to repossess a 
house if the owner defaults). The second column shows results using pooled OLS over the entire 
estimation period.  
 
 Table 5. Pooled estimates for real mortgage loans, 1982-2003 and sub-periods. 
  1982-2003 1982-1992 1993-2003 










































Adjusted R-squared  0.71 0.75 0.74 
S.E. of regression  0.0397 0.0364 0.0400 
D-W 1.98 1.97 1.83 
Nr of observations  275 124 151 
Fixed country-effects are not shown. 
** = significant at the 5% significance level, * = significant at the 10% significance level. 
 
From this, we note the following results: 
•  Lagged changes in the log of real mortgage debt have a positive effect, which may reflect 
adjustment time but could also indicate omitted variables. As noted before, the cross-country 
nature of this study does not allow taking into account some factors that can be included in 
single-country estimates. 
•  Higher real disposable income per person has a positive and significant effect on mortgage 
demand, indicating that households take advantage of increased affordability to exert 
additional mortgage demand. 
18
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•  Higher capital costs (the after-tax interest rate on the mortgage-financed part of the house 
value) choke off demand for housing loans. Based on the empirical outcomes, changes in the 
nominal rather than the real interest rates have been included.  
•  Major financial deregulation measures have had a positive effect on the demand for 
mortgages.     
•  Booming stock markets add positively to the demand for mortgages, with a two year lag. 
Most likely, this reflects a wealth effect. In addition, increased consumer confidence could be 
a factor. 
•  Contemporaneous house price changes have a positive effect on mortgage loans granted.  
•  Inflation has a negative effect on real mortgage lending growth, possibly reflecting the 
demand-reducing effect of higher initial debt burdens that results from inflation. The 
coefficient value indicates that the negative impact is relatively strong.  
 
The positive effect of house prices on mortgage lending could be related to house price increases 
not being exogenous to mortgage credit. Higher house prices, for instance reflecting increasing 
housing demand, are often accompanied by increased mortgage demand, also reflecting mortgage 
equity withdrawal. At the same time, increasing mortgage supply for instance by looser bank 
standards, may increase finance availability to larger parts of the population, thus putting upward 
pressure on housing demand.  
 
We formally tested for Granger-causality, and were not able to reject the hypothesis that 
mortgage debt does not ‘cause’ house prices. Following the approach adopted by Follain and 
Dunsky (1997), a (simple) equation for house price increases was run (table 6), and the estimated 
values were included in the equation for real mortgage debt. This, however, did not affect the sign 
of the coefficient, remaining positive and significant, providing indications that the above 
equation-specification is not seriously biased. A significant effect of property prices on bank 
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Table 6. Pooled estimations for house prices, 1982-2003 
 OLS 
∆ LOG REAL HOUSE PRICE (-1)   0.64  
(14.9)** 
∆ CAPITAL COST (-1)  -0.026 
(-3.5)** 
LOG REAL STOCK MARKET (-1)  0.03 
(2.5)** 




AFFORDABILITY INDEX¶  -0.04 
(-4.1)** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.59
S.E. of regression  0.0472
D-W 1.90
Nr of observations  275
Fixed country-effects are not shown. 
¶ Affordability is measured as interest payments over disposable income, divided by the long-run average 
of that variable. A negative sign thus indicates that a high share of interest payments in income dampens 
real mortgage demand.  
** = significant at the 5% significance level, * = significant at the 10% significance level. 
 
A number of other variables were not included in the final equations.  
 
-  This applies to tax measures other than tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments. 
While including other tax factors affecting mortgage demand would be desirable, the required 
data are not available on an EU–wide basis for the period under consideration. To capture 
some fiscal aspects, tax reform dummies were included in years of major housing tax reforms 
but the results were not very satisfactory.
13 Compensatory fiscal measures or the spreading 
out of measures and of their effects over time may account for this result.
14 
 
-  Population growth also did not produce satisfactory results. It could be expected that larger 
populations call for more dwellings, and therefore more mortgage lending. The non-
significance could be related to the fact that what matters more is population in the age group 
                                                           
13 Englund and Ioannides (1997), studying international house price dynamics for 15 OECD countries, also 
tested for fiscal effects via the introduction of dummies for years with major tax reforms but generally also 
failed to find significant effects.  
14  At the national level, household surveys indicate the importance of fiscal stimulus to the housing market. 
Martins and Villanueva (2003), for instance, estimate lower probabilities of new loan contracts after the 
scaling down of a Portuguese interest subsidy programme. 
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around 20-35. Furthermore, the number of households could be a more relevant factor than 
the population size.
15 Finally, demographic variables may matter only in the longer-term. 
 
-  Changes in the government pension expenditure ratios were also included, but without 
success. Inclusion of this variable can be justified by arguing that high government spending 
on old-age benefits reduces households’ incentives to invest in housing as a means of 
securing income at retirement via absence of interest and principal payments. Doling and 
Horsewood (2003) argue that outright house ownership enables the elderly to live rent-free, 
and thus facilitates early retirement. However, no such effect was discernable in the data.  
 
As to the capital cost variable included, slightly more elaborate measures were tested. Expected 
capital gains on real estate have been included in additional specifications as such gains reduce 
the costs of owning a house.
16  This is reflected in the following specification of the capital costs: 
CC
b = (1-t).r. M  –  (V
e
t+1-Vt)        [3] 
with    CC
b   = broad measure of capital costs of mortgage-financed own housing, and  
 V
e
t+1  = expected house price next year 
 
Dividing by the house price (V) then gives: 
CC
b  = (1-t).r. M  –  (V
e
t+1-Vt)        [ 4 ]  
 Vt              Vt                 Vt          
 
which states that the capital cost per house price unit equals the after-tax interest rate on the 
mortgage-financed part of the house value minus the expected percentage increase in the house 
price. Next year’s house price has been modelled as an ARMA (1.1) process.
17 The more refined 
concept of capital costs did not produce satisfactory results. Including the variable substantially 
reduced the goodness of fit, although the variable remained significant. This result possibly 
reflects the volatile nature of expected capital gains in our specification. It could also reflect the 
exclusion of other capital cost elements, such as the (opportunity) costs of the non-mortgage 
(equity) part of housing finance, government subsidy schemes, or property taxation.  
 
                                                           
15 The number of households is growing faster than population. While EU population grew by 5% between 
1980 and 1995, the number of households increased by 19%. However, no complete dataset on the number 
of households is available over the entire horizon. 
16 For lack of data, pre-tax capital gains have been used, which however may not differ too much from 
after-tax gains given absence of a capital gains tax in some countries, and exemptions from this tax when 
sold after a number of years of occupying and owning it in other countries. 
17 A similar approach was adopted by Rosen (1979) for the US.   
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Similarly, the empirical results did not improve when using the difference between housing 
capital costs and renting costs. While this could be seen as a relevant cost measure for households 
deciding between buying and renting a house, there was no empirical support for this hypothesis, 
both when including and when excluding capital gains in the capital cost measure. 
 
To test the robustness of the results, a number of alternative estimation procedures were followed. 
This includes changes to the time period covered, to the estimation technique used, and to the 
countries included.  
 
As regards the time period, the sample was split in two, and separate equations were run for both 
sub-periods (table 5, 3rd and 4th column). Statistical results for the deregulation dummy and for 
real household income differ considerably between the sub-periods, with the coefficients loosing 
statistical significance over time. Given the concentration of deregulation activities in the first 
half of the sample, this is not very disturbing. As to real disposable income, decreased 
significance possibly reflects increasing leanness of banks in offering mortgage credit, as is also 
reflected in higher loan-to-value and loan-to-income standards over time. It might also indicate 
that an increased share of the population is no longer liquidity-constrained, thus reducing the 
relevance of current income and increasing the relevance of wealth. However, the latter 
hypothesis is not fully consistent with our results, with stock market coefficients staying 
marginally decreasing over time.     
 
Next, the equations were re-estimated using White-consistent estimators and 2-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS), to test for sensitivity to the estimation techniques. The first estimator has been 
applied to tackle possible heteroscedasticity, while 2SLS has been applied to take account of 
possible effects of the dependent variable (mortgage loans) on independent variables, notably 
house prices. Comparing results (table 7), household disposable income seizes to be significant 
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Table 7. Real mortgage loans growth to households, 1982-2003 
 OLS  WHITE  2SLS 













































§ 0.71 0.68  0.74 
S.E. of regression  0.0397 0.0393  0.0410 
D-W
§ 1.98 2.03  2.17 
Nr of observations  275 275  203 
Fixed country-effects are not shown. 
§ Weighted statistics  
** = significant at the 5% significance level, * = significant at the 10% significance level. 
 
Finally, the sensitivity of the outcomes to the countries included in the sample was tested, as 
results of pooled estimates can be dominated by one particular country. Large differences 
between the housing and mortgage markets in the countries of the EU do not allow for an a priori 
exclusion of this possibility. The basic equation was therefore re-estimated leaving out one 
country at the time. Table 8 shows the lowest and largest value of all coefficients obtained as well 
as the country that was deleted from the sample to arrive at that result. Overall, coefficient values 
and significance levels were not much affected by leaving out a country. Disposable income lost 
some significance when leaving out Finland and Greece, but in both cases remained significant at 
the 10% level. Furthermore, coefficient variation is relatively high for household income and for 
consumer price inflation. Finally, the table shows that Greece can be identified as somewhat 
outlying, reflected in four occasions where the coefficient was highest or lowest when leaving out 
Greece. Dispersion of results is reasonably well spread over the other countries, with 
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Table 8. Coefficient characteristics
§ 
 OLS  MIN  MAX  Coefficient 
dispersion* 





















































§  Name of country excluded in the estimation-equation in brackets. 
* The coefficient dispersion measures the difference between the maximum and the minimum coefficient 
value, divided by the full-sample OLS coefficient value. 
 
Sub-grouping for countries was also applied to analyse whether countries can be grouped on the 
basis of mortgage finance systems. Country sub-divisions according to Kasparova and White 
(2001) and Tsatsaranis and Zhu (2004) did not produce results that deviate markedly from the 
results for the EU total as shown in the tables above.
18 We also considered the twelve euro area 
countries as a specific sub-group. Compared to the larger sample of 15 EU countries, this subset 
is more-monetary policy relevant, but on the other hand it results in the loss of a number of 
observations. Again, results for the coefficient values and the significance levels did not depart 
markedly from those reported above for the EU 15-sample of countries. 
 
Overall, therefore, our results indicate that real mortgage debt in the EU is affected negatively by 
after-tax interest rates, and positively by stock market growth, house price increases and financial 
deregulation, while the impact of disposable income and inflation is less evident.  
 
                                                           
18 Based on mortgage finance systems, Tsatsaranis & Zhu (2004) distinguish three groups: Belgium, 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, next Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and finally the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and Sweden. Kasparova and White (2001) group the countries as follows: Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, then Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal, and finally 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, one reason for focussing on fiscal aspects of mortgage debt is 
that fiscal factors represent a policy instrument. While the previous sections only focused on a 
very limited set of fiscal instruments, and fiscal aspects are underrepresented in economic 
housing research, it is relevant to briefly discuss the use of fiscal instruments in avoiding or 
correcting housing market imbalances. This issue is increasingly relevant as euro area countries 
no longer have national monetary policies to their disposal, and the macroeconomic importance 
of mortgage debt is growing with its size. Unlike in equity markets, national instruments affecting 
housing and mortgage markets do not seem to have lost effectiveness due to increasing 
internationalisation of markets. As mortgage developments are linked to underlying housing 
market developments, this section also includes measures that impact on the demand and supply 
of owner-occupied dwellings.  
 
We first discuss government policies to reduce housing market volatility in general and next some 
specific fine-tuning measures.
19  In doing so, we will only hint at some main strengths and 
weaknesses of the instruments, as its concrete use must depend heavily on country- and situation-
specific features. The effectiveness of certain instruments may be specific to certain conditions. 
As an illustration, housing supply may be very inelastic in the short and medium-term because of 
restrictive land policies. In such a case, increasing demand for houses on account of more 
generous fiscal subsidies is likely to be reflected to a large extent in higher house prices. Such 
subsidy capitalisation benefits current home-owners, turning the tax subsidy in an instrument of 




Reducing housing market volatility 
A number of structural fiscal measures can be considered that counterbalance sharp changes in 
mortgage debt or house prices. 
 
•  High stamp duties can be used to stabilise housing markets. Stamp duties is a transaction tax 
that is payable when buying a house, and it is one element in transaction costs, which for 
instance also include property registration fees. Stamp duty rates in Europe vary from 0% (in 
                                                           
19 Alternative policy options, including prudential supervisory policy, regional policy, and improved 
information disclosure, fall outside the scope of this paper.  
20 Berger et al. (2000) even conclude that government subsidies on interest rates in Sweden have been fully 
capitalised, although this is not undisputed. 
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4. Fiscal instruments to influence housing markets 
some cases in Finland and Ireland) up to 13% in Greece. Increasing stamp duties raises the 
costs of moving, thus reducing housing speculation by reducing liquidity. However, it may 
distort the choice of (potential) house owners and negatively impact on labour mobility.
21  
 
•  Increasing the role of automatic stabilisers can also be considered, for example via a regular 
updating of market values of dwellings as the tax base for real estate tax, property tax, wealth 
tax and/or tax on imputed rent. Regular updating implies that taxes are levied on recent 
market-based values. As a result, house price booms would automatically raise the tax 
amount, thus raising the costs of housing and dampening demand. Not updating housing 
values, on the other hand, usually results in regressive taxation as the tax burden as 
percentage of the house price falls in case of rising house prices. Related to this, Muellbauer 
(2003) advocates introducing property taxes with up-to-date market values as valuation basis, 
attributing a major part of the stable housing development in Denmark to this type of tax. 
 
•  The capital gains tax could also include anti-cyclical (or anti-speculation) elements. Making 
exemptions from capital gains taxes for primary houses depending on the number of years it 
has been owner-occupied before it is sold provides fiscal incentives to keep dwellings longer. 
However, increasing the cost of moving negatively affects labour mobility rates. 
 
•  Structural reductions in mortgage interest tax relief, lowering demand at given interest rates, 
could also have a beneficial effect on housing market volatility. Indeed, Van den Noord 
(2003) reports that house price variability is highest in countries with the largest tax wedges. 
At the same time, reducing mortgage interest deductibility will increase the interest-
sensitivity of mortgage demand and - to the extent that this subsidy is capitalised - will cause 
capital losses for current owners. Suggestions to restrict this type of subsidy can be found in 
the Contact Group on Asset Prices (2002).  
 
•  A high elasticity of housing supply can reduce the likelihood of excessive housing market 
developments. A case in point is Germany where low price volatility, amongst others, reflects 
municipalities’ policies of releasing more land and building permits in housing market 
upswings (Kasparova and While, 2001). In other countries, less strict regulations on land use 
                                                           
21 Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn (2003) estimate for the Netherlands that a 1%-point increase in 
transaction costs (which apart from stamp duties also includes capital gains taxes and brokerage fees) 
relative to the house price decreases home-owners’ mobility by 8%. 
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may be required to achieve this. However, annual new housing supply on average is only a 
fraction of existing housing stock (around 1%), not sufficient to offset large price pressures, 
while production time lags also need to be taken into account.  
 
•  A large private rental sector may act as a shock absorber, helping to contain housing market 
shocks. Assuming private rents not to react instantaneously to house price changes, the rental 
sector offers an alternative for those preferring to wait for a housing boom or bust to pass 
over. By taking away fraction of the demand for own houses, price pressures may be limited 
while at the same time labour mobility may be fostered as moving does not automatically 
imply buying another house.
22 In addition, owners of private rental houses may seek to sell 
these houses during house price booms, thus increasing owner-occupied housing supply. 
Changes in the degree of tenants’ protection, in rent regulation and in the often unfavourable 
tax positions of landlords may be needed to increase rental supply. 
 
Fine-tuning housing markets 
While the above measures can be considered for reducing housing market volatility in general, in 
specific circumstances these may not be sufficient as regards size or timing. Fine-tuning measures 
then may need to be considered. We discuss VAT rates, stamp duties, property taxes, and 
subsidies. 
 
•  In five EU countries, building and repairing houses is subject to the normal VAT rate, while 
in the other ten, a reduced rate applies or it is even fully exempted. Varying rates according to 
the cyclical state of the housing market could be considered but legal constraints from the EU 
level need to be taken into account, and the supply response may take some time to realize. 
 
•  Raising stamp duties in a housing boom may cool off the market. In the UK, stamp tax 
'holidays’ have been implemented in 1992, during which period the threshold for stamp 
duties was raised. This lowers transaction costs of moving, and therefore should have a 
positive effect on housing market activity. However, if anticipated, changes in these tax rates 
could become a source of volatility rather than limiting it. Furthermore, its effectiveness may 
be limited, given that costs can be spread out over the duration of mortgage contracts, there 
                                                           
22 For the UK, persons in private rented houses have highest mobility rates, according to Cameron and 
Muellbauer (1998).  
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are numerous other costs involved in changing residence, and some countries allow such 
costs to be included in the mortgage amount. 
 
•  Changes in property tax rates can be used to fine-tune housing market developments. 
Maclennan et al. (1999) propose using the property tax to reduce house price volatility in the 
UK, making the Bank of England responsible for setting the property tax rate.  
 
•  Subsidies may be temporarily raised or lowered with a view to stabilising housing markets. 
This, for instance, has been applied in Portugal in 1999 when the government tightened 
eligibility requirements for mortgage subsidies directed towards low-income families, with a 
view to avoid overheating the housing market. Measures can equally be taken on the supply 
side, extending or reducing temporary investment incentives. 
 
The possibilities and effectiveness of fiscal fine-tuning of housing markets can be questioned (see 
also Contact Group on Asset Prices, 2002). First, it needs to be established that there is 
disequilibrium, and that serious repercussions from not stopping it could arise (Nickell, 2002). 
Second, the timing and calibration of discretionary policies need to be appropriate. In this respect, 
Stephens (1996), surveying the UK government responses during the housing market recession in 
the early 1990s, found three out of the eight government measures to be anti-cyclical (for instance 
the increase in the stamp duty threshold), two neutral, and two pro-cyclical.
23 Finally, another 
drawback of using fine-tuning measures could be that it creates uncertainty in the market and 
could lead to anticipatory behaviour which may become a source of volatility too. 
 
While in general structural measures seem to be preferable, exactly which measure to use in a 
given situation and country very much depends on national characteristics of the mortgage and 
housing markets, and the fiscal instruments available. In applying them, due account has to be 
given to other considerations, notably effects on labour mobility, the effectiveness of the 
instruments, and possible distortionary effects in housing markets. In addition, experiences as in 
Sweden in the early 1990s suggest that small changes to fiscal instruments generally seem 
preferable to avoid large disruptions to housing markets, with adverse effects on the economy and 
on financial stability. 
                                                           
23 He also considered policy changes by lenders, building societies and insurance companies, and assessed 
most of their measures to be pro-cyclical, e.g. tightening capital adequacy requirements during housing 
recessions, widening margins to cover for provisions and write-offs, and lowering loan-to-value ratios. 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
Mortgage market developments increasingly gain importance for economic analysis and 
policymaking. While the role of fiscal instruments in affecting mortgage growth often is 
acknowledged in the theoretical literature, the empirical follow-up has been minimal.  
 
The empirical analysis for 15 EU countries, based on pooled regressions, indicates that real 
mortgage lending is positively affected by financial deregulation measures, stock market growth, 
and house price increases, while after-tax interest rates exert a negative effect. The latter includes 
tax elements via the deductibility of interest payments. Real growth of disposable income may 
positively affect mortgage debt, and inflation may do so negatively, although the evidence for 
these two variables is rather mixed. Changes to the time period, the estimation-method and the 
countries included indicate that these results are fairly robust. Nevertheless, caveats regarding 
data-based analysis of fiscal effects on mortgage debt, notably related to data availability, quality 
and comparability, call for caution in interpreting the results. Future work that may lead to a 
further underpinning of the conclusions could focus on extending the fiscal aspects of mortgages 
to be included in the empirical analysis. In addition, there may be benefits to a formal framework 
for modelling housing and mortgage developments, separating mortgage demand from supply 
factors and including explicit linkages between home-ownership and mortgage demand.  
 
Finally, this paper briefly examined opportunities for and limitations on employing fiscal 
instruments to correct housing market imbalances. Only main strengths and weaknesses of the 
main instruments have been discussed as its concrete should depend on country- and situation-
specific features. In general, where needed, structural fiscal measures can be envisaged to reduce 
housing market volatility, which could focus on reduced mortgage interest relief and on increased 
reliance on automatic stabilisation, for instance via regular updates of housing values relevant for 
property and other taxes. More reservations seem to be needed for applying fine-tuning measures 
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Annex 1.  Main tax instruments affecting housing/mortgages in EU countries, 2003 
 
A1 Tax on imputed rents 
Country Yes/No  Remark 
Austria     N   
Belgium  Y  On the basis of average net rent values  
Denmark      N  Replaced in 2000 by county and municipal property taxes 
Finland      N   
France      N  Abolished in 1965 
Germany      N  Abolished in 1987 
Greece      N  Abolished in 2003 
Ireland      N   
Italy  Y  But owner-occupied dwelling largely exempted 
Luxembourg  Y  But tax amount based on dated values 
Netherlands  Y  Up to 0.8% of market value, with a maximum 
Portugal      N   
Spain      N  Unless owner does not occupy the dwelling, then imputed rent due 
Sweden      N  Replaced by a real estate tax in 1991 
UK      N  Abolished in 1963 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2003) 
 
A2. Tax on capital gains 
 




Austria  Y  50%  No taxation if sold more than 10 years after acquisition 
Belgium Y  16.5% 
(flat) 
No taxation if sold more than 5 years after acquisition 
Denmark  Y  15%  Owner-occupied dwellings excluded 
Finland  Y  29%  No taxation if used 2 years or more as primary 
residence 
France  Y  49.6%  No taxation if principal residence 
Germany  Y  48.5%  Owner-occupied dwellings excluded 
Greece    N   -   
Ireland  Y  20%  No taxation on private residence 
Italy  Y  45%  Principal dwelling of owner excluded 
Luxembourg  Y  38%  Main residence exempted from taxation 
Netherlands N  -   
Portugal  Y  40%  Exemption for permanent dwelling if gain reinvested 
in permanent residence within certain time period 
Spain  Y  25%  Not taxation if reinvested in new primary residence 
Sweden Y  30%   
(flat) 
Deferred taxation on major residence if gain exceeds a  
threshold 
UK  Y  40%  Main residence excluded from taxation 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2003) 
* The tax rates are not well comparable as they disregard thresholds applying, deductions allowed 
from the capital gains, the progression of the system, the number of years the dwelling has been 
owned and occupied, and local surcharges. 
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Austria  Y  50%  Tax deductible as special expense up to a limit that goes 
to 0 as annual income increases 
Belgium  Y  50%  Tax deductible up to income from immovable property, 
but some additional deduction possible. Deduction 
decreases over time, for at most 12 years 
Denmark  Y  15%  Deductible from capital income that is subject to income 
tax, unlimited  
Finland Y  29%  (flat 
rate) 
Normally deductible from capital income that is subject to 
income tax 
France  N -  Gradually abolished over the period 1991-2000. Only tax 
credit in very special cases for loans before 1998  
Germany  N - 
scheme (Eigenheimzulage) 
Greece  Y  40%  Since 2003, tax credit of 15% for annual mortgage 
interest, subject to limits 
Ireland  Y  42%  "Tax credit" at 20% standard income tax rate, at source, 
with (low) limits 
Italy  Y  45%  Tax credit of 19% for annual mortgage interest, with limit 
Luxembourg  Y  38%  Tax deductible, with (low) limits 
Netherlands  Y  52%  Tax deductible without limit, for at most 30 years 
Portugal  Y  40%  Tax credit of 30% of mortgage interest and amortisation, 
with a limit 
Spain  Y  45%  Tax credit of 25% of amounts paid (principal and interest) 
in first two years, 20% thereafter up to a threshold, and 
15% for payments above the threshold  
Sweden  Y  30%  Interest not attributable to any source of income is 
deductible from capital income 
UK  N -  Abolished in a number of steps (1983, 1988, 1991, 2000) 







Abolished in 1986 with the introduction of a subsidy  
Annex 2: Data sources 
 
GDP       EMF  (2004)   
Number of dwellings        EMF (2004) 
Household disposable income      OECD 
Loan-to-value  ratio     EMF  (2004) 
House  price      BIS/ECB 
Marginal income tax rate      Office of Tax Policy (2002) 
Mortgage debt as % of GDP      EMF (2004) 
Mortgage interest rates        OECD/IMF  
Pension expenditure        OECD Social Expenditure database 
Population      Eurostat 
Rent  price  indices     ILO,  Laborsta 
Stock market indices        Thomson financial services/Datastream 
 
Explanatory notes to the data: 
 
•  Household disposable income: For Greece and Luxembourg, data refer to compensation of 
employees, as sufficiently long time-series on disposable household income are not available. 
•  Marginal income tax rates for mortgage interest deduction: estimates of the top marginal 
personal income tax rate for an average family, multiplied by a variable broadly reflecting the 
tax deductibility of interest payments in a year in a country. The latter variable has value 1 if 
there is no limit on deductibility, a value 0 in case no deduction is allowed at all, and value 
0.5 in intermediate cases.  
•  Mortgage debt. Up to 1997, data refer to mortgage debt as included in ECB (2003). The 
series have been extended on the basis of annual growth rates of residential mortgage debt 
from European Mortgage Federation (2004). For Luxemburg, EMF data have been used for 
the entire sample. 
•  Mortgage interest rate: Compiled for each country as a weighted average of short-term and 
long-term interest rates, the weights being the share of short- respectively long-term mortgage 
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Annex 3: Major financial deregulation measures in EU countries 
 
 Year  Financial  Deregulation  Measure 
Belgium  1987  Abandoning of interest rate setting for deposits 
Denmark  1982  Liberalisation of mortgage contracts and interest rate setting 
Spain  1987  Deregulation of interest rates 
Finland  1986/87  Interest rate deregulation/ withdrawal of mortgage lending guidelines 
France  1987  Elimination of credit controls 
Greece  1987  Interest rate deregulation 
Ireland  1986  Elimination of credit controls 
Italy  1994  Elimination distinction short-  long-term credit institutions 
Portugal 1984  Private  banking  allowed 
Portugal   1996  Final stage of privatisation process 
Sweden  1985  Interest rate deregulation, abolishment bank lending ceilings 




Annex 4: ADF test on unit roots, 1981-2003 
 Level  Change 
Log real mortgage loans to households   7.17  45.82
** 
Log consumer price level  103.44
** 87.15
*** 
Log real disposable income per person  9.86  99.58
*** 
Capital costs  14.31  157.83
*** 
Log real house prices  44.14
** 74.27
*** 
Log real stock index  19.44
** 192.74
*** 
Log pension expenditure (% of GDP)  21.12
*** 115.56
*** 
Log nominal rent index  88.59
*** 84.49
*** 
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